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MEASURING THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL FLOWS ON MACROECONOMIC 




The  effects  of  changes  in  foreign  portfolio  investment  flows  on  Brazilian  GDP  and 
investment  during  the  financial  crisis  of  2008  are  evaluated  through  impulse-response 
functions,  parsimonious  models,  and  out of  sample  forecasts.  Impulse-response  functions 
results show a positive relation between fixed income flows and GDP and investment, but 
this relation is not as strong between the real variables and equity flows, although these flows 
anticipate GDP and investment behavior. Expectations seem to have an important role in 
explaining  GDP  and  investment,  which  also  have  an  influence  on  flows.  The  reduced 
vulnerability of the Brazilian economy consequently lessened the effect of the crisis when 
compared with previous crisis episodes. 
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Resumo 
Os efeitos de mudanças nos fluxos de investimento de portfólio sobre o PIB e investimento 
no  Brasil  durante  a  crise  financeira  de  2008  é  avaliado  através  de  funções  de  impulso-
resposta,  modelos  parcimoniosos  e  previsões  fora  da  amostra.  As  funções  de  impulso-
resposta mostram uma relação positiva entre fluxos para renda fixa e PIB e investimento, mas 
esta relação não é tão forte quanto a que aparece entre as variáveis reais e os fluxos para 
ações, embora os fluxos antecipem o comportamento do PIB e do investimento. Expectativas 
parecem ter um papel importante na explicação do PIB e do investimento, que também têm 
influência  sobre  os  fluxos.  A  reduzida  vulnerabilidade  externa  da  economia  brasileira 
diminuiu os efeitos da crise em comparação com episódios anteriores de crise.  
Palavras-Chave: Investimento externo em carteira, Investimento, Crescimento, Crise, 
Brasil 
Códigos JEL: F32, E32, E22 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper the relationship between financial flows and real variables in Brazil will be 
explored.  The  real  variables  are  GDP  and  investment  growth.  The  financial  flows  to  be 
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analyzed are  foreign portfolio  investment (FPI) flows trade in the country,  because these 
flows are more prone to be immediately affected by changes in domestic and international 
scenarios. The hypothesis is that the financial flows are not enough to explain the downturn 
of the economy, but that the decisions which led to flow reversal and reduced investment are 
influenced by the same sort of expectations. 
Foreign portfolio investors heavily withdrew resources from Brazil in the final quarter of 
2008, even without changes in the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals, which could help 
to explain the fall in GDP and investment during the crisis through a financial channel, the 
FPI flows, due to changes in expectations. Such a change in expectations could be a higher 
uncertainty perception and the ―fly to quality‖ result as a consequence. These possibilities 
will be tested through the relation between GDP growth and changes in investments and the 
following  financial  variables: domestic  interest rate, real effective  exchange rate, country 
risk, and FPI flows. Results show that the drops in investment and GDP were greater than 
what would be expected from the outflow of FPI. This means that domestic agents reacted to 
the crisis in a very pessimistic way, or were more risk averse, which led to a greater fall in 
GDP and investment than the reaction of FPI, without previous deterioration of external or 
fiscal accounts. On the other hand, historical experience shows that flows react to fiscal and 
external accounts figures, which means that if the variables related to them were not good, 
the fall could have been even worse. In other words, it seems that sound macroeconomic 
policy paid off and allowed for a relatively fast recovery of the Brazilian economy. 
There is an important theoretical and empirical relation between risk and interest rates. In a 
fixed exchange regime, higher risk should lead to a higher interest rate, in order to attract 
capital and avoid the depletion of international reserves. In other words, when the risk is 
higher on bonds from domestic issuers, the interest rate has to be higher to maintain parity 
with international rates. In a floating exchange rate regime the higher risk results in capital 
leaving the country, and domestic currency will then depreciate. Given a pass-through from 
external to internal prices, exchange rate depreciation has to be followed by higher interest 
rates in order to fight inflation rates. This means that risk should lead the policy interest rate. 
The  relation  between  risk  and  exchange  rate  depends  on  the  exchange  rate  regime.  It  is 
customary for the Brazilian Central Bank to intervene in the market, trying to influence the 
exchange rate or its volatility. Risk, on the other hand, is only market determined. Both risk 
and  exchange  rates  can  be  influenced  by  the  same  perceptions  and  information,  but  the 
exchange rate should be less sensitive, because of its relations to the real economy through 
imports, exports, factor remunerations, and  not only  financial  market indicators  like risk. 
Flows may depend on operational arrangements, unlike risk. Thus, flows will not react to the 
other variables as fast as risk. As the Brazilian Central Bank adopted a semi-fixed exchange 
rate from 1995 to 1998, a dummy variable will be included for this period. 
The crisis has shown again that financial variables have an influence on the behavior of the 
real economy and how strong this influence can be. Suppressing or reverting previous finance 
flows  had  strong  impacts  on  economic  growth around the  world.  In  the  specific  case  of 
Brazil, there was an initial belief that the crisis initiated in 2008 would not strongly affect the   3 
economy because it was not generated in the country and Brazilian economic fundamentals 
were strong. In fact, Brazil and other emerging economies were harshly affected. If the cause 
of decreased output in emerging economies is not in respective local economy fragilities or 
economic policies, there has to be a link between the local and world economies which leads 
to the fall. Given that this crisis originated mainly in the financial system (AÏT-SAHALIA et 
al., 2010), the operation of the financial system or international flows of resources could be a 
good first guess for the origin of the problem. If the flows were responsible, an econometric 
model linking the flows and real variables should detect them as the cause. The question 
raised in this paper is if the reversal of FPI flows is enough to explain the slowdown of the 
Brazilian economy after the crisis. The channels that are working are not modeled, but some 
hints of the operation can be derived from the results. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section a very brief theoretical revision is 
presented. It relates to financial flows and their importance for growth, current account and 
foreign reserves and their relation with economic policy and the exchange rate regime. In the 
third  section  the  data  are  explained  and  put  in  perspective,  along  with  the  descriptive 
statistics. Section four shows the econometric results and discussion. It covers the impulse-
response functions, parsimonious models, and out of sample forecasts. Section five presents 
the concluding remarks. The results show that the changes in the real variables are not only a 
reaction to the flow, but that expectations, not only the flows themselves, seem to have had a 
major role. 
2. Importance of flows, balance of payments, and exchange rate 
Relying  on  FPI  for  financing  economic  growth  assumes  the  risk  that  a  country  become 
dependent on FPI flows, and if and when these flows revert, domestic growth is hampered 
(GRIFFITH-JONES  and  OCAMPO,  2009).  The  effects  of  the  instability  of  the  financial 
flows  are  explored  in  literature  on  sudden  stops  (CALVO,  2003)  and  current  account 
reversals  (EDWARDS,  2008).  When  a  sudden  stop  happens  it  is  necessary  to  reduce 
domestic absorption, because less international financing is available as a counterpart to the 
current account deficit. This lessens the demand for imported products but also for domestic 
output  with  foreign  inputs,  induced  by  higher  costs  of  imported  products  given  by  a 
depreciated exchange rate or barriers to imports. In more open countries the costs are lower 
(EDWARDS,  2008).  The  sudden  stop  has  more  immediate  effects  on  the  economy  than 
current account reversals (EDWARDS, 2007). 
International financing through FPI can have a stabilizing effect on the economy if the flows 
occur  when  the  asset  prices  are  low.  FPI  can  also  be  a  feasible  financing  alternative, 
diversifying sources of finance. The volatility of the flows is unavoidable because they react 
to  constantly  revised  information  (ERRUNZA,  2001).  The  ―market  sentiment‖  plays  an 
important role in the determination of flows (BAEK, 2006). 
The  effect  of  the  flows  on  real  variables  can  happen  through  the  effect  on  demand  via 
exchange rate or credit, or indirectly by influencing the behavior of the financial system. The 
effect  through  exchange  rate  or  credit  means  that  higher  inflows  would  lead  to  an   4 
appreciation of the domestic currency, stimulating imports and making domestic production 
relatively costly, thus inhibiting its growth. On the other hand, an appreciated currency can 
induce  higher  investment  in  imported  equipment  and  software.  The  domestic  financial 
institutions or  firms could  employ  international  resources as  funding to expand domestic 
credit or investment, thus leading to higher growth. 
The short run effects, through current account financing and exchange rates, are important 
and the strong swings in flows give importance to the effects of the FPI. Because of these 
interrelations between  flows and real  variables  beyond the  flows, other variables that are 
important for the behavior of GDP and investment have to be considered. The exchange rate 
will affect prices of domestic output relative to foreign, which has an impact on output. On 
the other hand, the exchange rate reacts to expectations and could be a risk indicator in the 
short run. Expectations about the domestic economy will also be reflected in the country’s 
risk. The hypothesis is that GDP and investment are negatively affected by local currency 
depreciations  and  higher  country  risk.  The  channel  for  this  could  be  the  financial  gap, 
because of the influence on flows, or shared expectations about the Brazilian economy among 
domestic producers, consumers, and foreign investors. This would lead to the possibility that 
foreign investment flows are related to domestic GDP and investment not only because there 
is  more  (less)  financing  available  in  periods  of  optimism  (pessimism)  but  also  that  the 
evaluation  of  the  future  of  the  economy  by  domestic  and  foreign  agents  is  similar.  The 
interest  rate  is  also  included  and  could  work  through  a  direct  relation  to  demand  for 
consumption or investment or indirectly through the exchange rate, with a negative relation 
between interest rate and GDP and investment. 
The economic fundamentals and their expectations have an important role in the behavior of 
financial variables, because in the long run financial assets have to reflect what happens to 
the real variables behind them. But these expectations also influence decisions about real 
variables  like  output  and  investment.  This  means  that  there  is  a  strong  link  between 
fundamentals and financial variables, which is explored in literature, e.g. SOARES, PINTO, 
and  MOREIRA (2010), and TELES and LEME (2010). 
3. Data, context, and descriptive statistics 
It seems that real and financial variables in the Brazilian economy were behaving normally at 
the beginning of the crisis, with obvious links to the external scenario and influences from 
domestic economic policy. Things changed noticeably in the fourth quarter of 2008. GDP 
dropped  and  investments  fell  even  more.  Brazilian  policy  makers  reacted  through  fiscal 
incentives in selected sectors and an ease on monetary policy. As a consequence, in the first 
quarter of 2009 Brazil’s interest rate was reduced to its lowest level in history. 
In  the  fourth  quarter  of  2008,  Brazilian  GDP  fell  3.3%  and  investment  fell  9.7%  in 
comparison to the all-time peak observed in the third quarter. In the first quarter of 2009, the 
declines were another 1.5% and 12%. Recovery began in the second quarter of 2009. The 
relation of these shortfalls to the international crisis is not straightforward. Unlike previous 
crises  that  impacted  Brazil,  when  the  recent  financial  crisis  became  stronger  and  spread   5 
around  the  world,  Brazil’s  external  accounts  situation  was  comfortable.  By  the  end  of 
September, 2008, the country had accumulated a bulk of 224 billion dollars in reserves, more 
than the total of the then 211 billion dollar external debt. The current account deficit was 
around 25 billion dollars in the 12 months prior to September, 2008, or about 1.6% of GDP. 
This deficit was easily financed by the FDI and FPI. This could mean that the impact of the 
crisis would be small in countries like Brazil, as believed by politicians like Brazil’s then 
President Lula. As the data demonstrates, the crisis hit Brazil strongly and the channel for this 
effect is an interesting field of research. 
Balance of payments data disaggregate FPI in four types of investments: equity traded in the 
country, equity traded abroad, fixed income traded in the country, and fixed income traded 
outside the country. As assets traded in Brazil have to be denominated in local currency, 
trading in the country or outside the country means that investors are exposed to different 
risks. Beyond the usual market risk, from the international investor’s standpoint, assets traded 
in  Brazil  also  incur  the  Brazilian  currency  exchange  rate  risk.  There  would  be  also  the 
convertibility  risk,  given  the  possibility  that  the  conversion  of  local  assets  in  foreign 
exchange could be restricted or even prohibited. During the time span analyzed in this paper 
there has not been any restriction of this kind. Rather, it has been the other way around; in 
times of strong inflows taxes were imposed on inflows in order to try to reduce the flows. 
This difference in risks is one of the reasons for separating flows traded inside and outside the 
country. The other is that while flows related to trades inside the country can come from both 
primary and secondary markets, in the case of trades abroad only primary market operations 
are registered in the balance of payments. This means that only the first sale of equity or 
bonds and their repayments have an impact on the balance of payments. All the secondary 
market trades do not have a direct impact on Brazilian foreign assets and liabilities. One 
difference that arises between flows in the country and abroad is that the latter are subject to 
demand and supply shocks, which can lead to situations in which no operations are carried 
out at all. Secondary market operations can occur at any time, only by adjusting prices, while 
primary  market operations are  evaluated by  issuers and  buyers over the adequacy of the 
prices for the issuance to take place or not. The disaggregation of the flows between equity 
and fixed income follows the traditional classification of financial market assets. 
Because the flows related to securities traded abroad are the primary issues or repayments of 
these securities and depend on the decisions of the Brazilian private sector or government to 
do so, only the flows related to trades inside Brazil are analyzed. In this way, the decisions of 
market participants to buy or sell Brazilian securities are feasible at any moment, because of 
the existence of a secondary market for equity and fixed income securities in Brazil. 
It is expected that the behavior of the different flows will show differences between them, but 
they  also  should  have  similarities,  due  to  the  common  underlying  fundamentals  of  the 
Brazilian economy. 
The data employed in this paper is described in Table 1. An L at the beginning of the name of 
the variable means it is expressed in logarithms and D means it is the first difference of the 
series. Data are quarterly, from 1995 to 2009.   6 
Table 1 – Data employed – Quarterly series - 1995 to 2009 
Variable  Description  Source  Remarks 
FC  Fixed Income Foreign Portfolio 




In billions of US dollars, at prices of 
the last quarter of 2009, employing 
the CPI as deflator 
EC  Equity Foreign Portfolio 




In billions of US dollars, at prices of 
the last quarter of 2009, employing 
the CPI as deflator 
LGDP  Log of real GDP index  Ipeadata  Log of the seasonally adjusted 
index, basis 1995 = 100 
DLGDP  First difference of LGDP     
LINV  Log of the investment index  Ipeadata  Log of the seasonally adjusted 
index, basis 1995 = 100 
DLINV  First difference of LINV     
LER  Log of the real effective 




Log of the index, basis June 1994 = 
100 
DLER  First difference of LER     
SELIC  Selic Interest rate, the 
monetary policy interest rate 
Brazilian Central 
Bank 
Average of monthly rates 
RISK  Brazilian EMBI+ spread over 
US Treasury bonds 
Datastream  In basis points (100 basis points = 
1%). Average of daily spreads 
DRISK  First difference of RISK     
 
The total value of FPI flows in comparison to GDP and current account s is significant. The 
net values of FPI grew from values near to zero  prior to 1990 to peaks near to 50 billion 
dollars in 2007 and 2009 with outflows higher than 5 billion dollars in 2002 and 2004, the 
only years with outflows since 1991. For the period of 1995 to 2009, the average net inflow 
was 13.5 billion dollars. These figures represent 48% of the financial account balance from 
1995 to 2009. On average, FPI represented 89% of the  FDI value. For the total amount of 
flows, FPI was 66% of the value of FDI from 1995 to 2009.  As a proportion of GDP, FPI 
ranged from -1% in 2002 to 3.5% in 2007. 
Figure 1 shows the quarterly net  flows (inflows minus outflows) of  FPI traded inside the 
country from 1995 to 2009. Flows of FPI traded in the country have become more important 
in both equity and fixed income from 2005 onwards. These flows show str ong inflows and 
outflows in several quarters. In the last quarter of 2008 EC was negative (8.8 billion dollars), 
but there was also a strong outflow over the whole third quarter (7.2 billion dollars), the same 
value that entered the country in the second quarter. The crisis may have generated the fourth 
quarter outflow, but outflows do not occur only in times of crisis. FC shows outflows of US$ 
1.6 and 1.7 billion in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, contrasting with a 
net inflow of US$ 16.9 billion over the first three quarters of 2008. In the last three quarters 
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Figure 1 – Brazil - Net Foreign Portfolio Investment, in billions of dollars of 2009 
 
Figure 2 shows real and financial variables that are linked to the flows. GDP shows steady 
growth beginning in 2004, but prior to this its growth rate was unstable. GDP fell 3.5% in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and another 0.9% in the first quarter of 2009. Investment stagnated 
since the beginning of the period, but shows growth from 2004 onwards. During the crisis 
investment was more strongly hit. GDP began to recover in the second quarter of 2009 and at 
the end of the year its level was 0.6% above that prior to the crisis. Investment also began to 
recover in the second quarter of 2009, but in the last quarter of 2009 was still 7% below its 
pre-crisis  level.  The  policy  interest  rate,  dubbed  SELIC,  changed  according  to  its  main 
objective of controlling the exchange rate from 1995 to 1998. Since then the main purpose of 
monetary policy has been to control inflation through formal inflation targeting. Immediately 
before  the  crisis  in  September  of  2008,  the  interest rate  had  been  raised  due  to  fears  of 
inflation, given expanded demand and a high level of utilization of capacity in industry. The 
rate was reduced from January to April, 2009, then reaching historically low levels. 
The Brazilian currency suffered a strong depreciation in 1999, forcing a change to a floating 
exchange  rate.  Since  then  the  currency  has  remained  sensitive  to  local  and  international 
environments,  like  the  Argentinean  crisis  in  2001  and  the  fear  of  Lula  winning  the 
Presidential election in 2002. The exchange rate continuously appreciated from 2003 until the 
third quarter of 2008. With the crisis, in the fourth quarter of 2008 the Brazilian currency 
depreciated,  but  after  that  appreciated  again.  Risk  was  at  historically  low  level  at  the 
beginning of the crisis. 
The local currency depreciated during the beginning of the crisis, and turned to appreciation 
in 2009, almost the same behavior of the EMBI+ spread, a measure of risk which peaked in 
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variables.  The  possibility  of  a  ―decoupling‖  of  the  emerging  market  economies,  like  the 
Brazilian, soon would be ruled out. The situation of fiscal and external accounts does not 
explain the strong fall in output and investments, unlike the other crises which had plagued 
the Brazilian economy in previous times. 
Figure 2 – Brazil – GDP index, Investment index, Interest rate, Real Effective Exchange 
Rate and EMBI+ Risk – 1995Q1 to 2009Q4 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. Flows related to assets traded in the 
country have a similar pattern, with positive and negative values, and  their coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation divided by average) is above three. 






















Average  0.829  1.154  0.007  0.006  21.736  99.570  658.364 
Maximum  9.380  15.049  0.038  0.067  69.120  162.883  1884.643 
Mínimum  -7.983  -8.849  -0.035  -0.118  8.650  67.237  149.809 
St.Dev.  2.631  3.958  0.013  0.040  11.418  25.014  386.427 
Coef.Var.  3.175  3.429  1.973  7.158  0.525  0.251  0.587 
N > 0  32  37  44  41  60  60  60 
 
For the real variables GDP  and investment  growth the  results are also as expected, with 
greater stability in GDP in comparison to investment. The financial variables interest rate, 
exchange rate, and risk show high volatility. The interest rate has a maximum of 69.1% and a 
minimum of 8.7%, with a high average of 21.7%. The highest exchange rate is 2.4 times the 
value of the lowest. These values are already smoothed by the average in the quarter and 
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RISK (Embi+ Brazil spread)  9 
rate.  Risk  shows  high  variability  because  of  the  structural  change  in  Brazilian  foreign 
accounts and volatility in international financial markets. 
Table 3 shows the unit root test results for the variables. These tests are carried out in order to 
avoid spurious results in the regressions. Log of GDP, log of investment, log of real effective 
exchange rate, and risk are stationary in first differences. The SELIC rate is level stationary. 
The  equity  flow  is  stationary,  but  the  fixed  income  flow  is  not.  An  examination  of  the 
behavior of this flow, Figure 1, shows that there seems to be a structural break in 2006Q1. 
Without enough observations to undergo the whole procedure suggested in PERRON (1989, 
1990), PERRON’s (1989) suggestion of estimating two regressions with one autoregressive 
term  for  the  period  before  and  after  the  break  is  followed.  A  Wald  test  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis that the autoregressive coefficient is equal to one for each equation. This means 
that the variable is stationary with a structural break in 2006Q1. The reason for this break is 
the exemption of foreign investors from income tax on earnings from public debt securities 
from February, which leads to a hike in inflows. 
Table 3 - ADF tests results 1995Q1 to 2009Q4 
(tests include intercept) 
Variable  t-ADF  Prob  Lags 
FC  -1.843  0.3566  0 
EC  -4.804  0.0001  3 
LGDP  1.125  0. 9973  0 
DLGDP  -7.7592  0.0000  0 
LINV  -0.1873  0.9339  2 
DLINV  -6.8748  0.0000  1 
SELIC  -6.010  0.0000  3 
LER  -1.333  0.6088  0 
DLER  -6.338  0.0000  0 
RISK  -1.879  0.3399  0 
DRISK  -6.574  0.0000  0 
4. Results and analysis 
This  section  will  attempt  to  explain  the  behavior  of  the  GDP  and  investment  change 
variables. The models were estimated employing equity and fixed income flows through a 
VAR and a parsimonious model. An advantage of the VAR estimation is that it does not 
include  contemporaneous  relationships,  avoiding  the  endogeneity  issue.  The  impulse-
response functions were estimated with data for the whole period from 1995 to 2009. In the 
parsimonious models contemporaneous interaction is allowed for and was estimated for the 
whole period and for the subsample 1995Q1 to 2008Q3. The last estimation results  were 
employed to evaluate the out of sample forecast capability of the models. Broadly speaking, 
the models tested are of the form: 
DLGDP = f(DLINV, SELIC, DLER, FLOW, DRISK) 
DLINV = f(DLGDP, SELIC, DLER, FLOW, DRISK) 
The Cholesky decomposition is employed for the impulse-response functions, which raises 
the question of ordering the variables in the VAR. The chosen order is: GDP-Investment-
Interest Rate-Exchange Rate-Flow-Country Risk. The change in GDP will be considered the 
most  exogenous  variable  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  least  prone  to  be  influenced   10 
contemporaneously  by  the  others,  especially  the  financial  variables.  The  economic 
explanation is that output decisions demand time until implemented. Financial asset prices, 
on  the  other  hand,  can  change  instantaneously.  Investment  changes  also  do  not  change 
instantaneously, but as this is a more restricted aggregate than GDP, the reaction can be faster 
than in GDP as a whole. The policy interest rate, SELIC, is defined in scheduled meetings of 
the Monetary Policy Committee of the Brazilian Central Bank. There is the possibility for 
exceptional committee meetings, but they are rare, representing only three out of the 147 total 
meetings  in  its  history. This gives some rigidity to the interest rate. As a  financial price 
variable, the interest rate changes instantaneously, but central banks are known to smooth the 
path  of  their  interest  rates.  It  is  more  likely  that  contemporaneous  GDP  and  investment 
influence the interest rate than the other way around. The relation between interest rates and 
exchange rates is well established, as is the determinant role of expectations. As expectations 
can change quickly, exchange rates can also adjust quickly to expectations. This means that 
in a floating regime the changes in exchange rates can happen over time with more flexibility 
than interest rates. Exchange rates and FPI flows tend to have a feedback relation, because 
exchange rates will influence the relative price of assets as well as the supply and demand of 
foreign  exchange. Beyond  FPI,  exchange  rates  will  result  from  the  balance  of  payments 
aggregate flows. As the current account transactions tend to react slower than financial flows 
to the economic environment, the exchange rate will react slower than flows, which means 
that flows are more endogenous at a given point of time. But, as current account expectations 
are already priced in the current exchange rates, changes in flows could also influence the 
exchange rate. As a robustness check the  impulse-response  functions were also run  with 
flows before exchange rates in the Cholesky ordering, but generated almost identical results. 
Risk is based on bond market prices and will incorporate all the available information at any 
moment, being the most endogenous of the variables analyzed. 
The  impulse-response  results  reported  below  are  generated  by  a  VAR  with  seven  lags, 
selecting the  longest  lag according to AIC, SC, or HQ criteria. Choosing the  longest  lag 
allows for real variables to react to financial variables. 
The impulse-response results in Figure 3 show that there is a positive response in changes in 
GDP and investment to a shock in the flow of fixed income traded in the country. In absolute 
terms, the change of investment is higher. This result may be important in explaining the 
response of economic activity to changes in flows. For equity flows the relation is positive in 
the first six quarters, becomes negative, and is close to zero after 10 quarters. This pattern is 
consistent with how flows to the stock market anticipate the behavior of the economy and 
even overreact, with a net effect close to zero in the long run. For both flows the influence on 
GDP and investment changes follows the same pattern, with higher values for investment. 
This may indicate that there is a relationship between the flows and domestic real variables 
through investment, and indirectly to GDP. 
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Figure 3 
Impulse-Response results - Responses of changes in GDP (DLGDP) and Investment 
(DLINV) to an impulse in Fixed Income Flows (FC) and Equity Flows (EC) 
 
Impulse-Response results in a VAR with EC flows 
 
 
Table 4 shows the results of a parsimonious model for DLGDP and DLINV employing FC 
and EC flows, estimated with all the explanatory variables, following the general-to-specific 
strategy (HENDRY, 2001), with only the variables significant at the 5% level left in the 
model. The model was estimated for the entire 1995-2009 period and then reestimated with 
the data up to the third quarter of 2008. Beyond the out of sample forecasts, this additional 
estimation was also useful as a robustness check of the results during the crisis period. 
For the changes in GDP, columns  1 and 2, the FPI flows are not significant in the final 
model.  This  does  not  mean  that the  flow  does  not  influence  growth.  The  effect  can  be 
captured by other variables which are influenced by the flow, like interest rates or investment, 
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positive inflows allow interest rates to be lower, leading to higher investment, which has a 
positive relation with GDP growth. The autoregressive term of LGDP is negative, probably 
due to adjusments in GDP growth, correcting for growth that is too fast or too slow. The 
influence of the interest rate on GDP occurs with a lag, as expected, but the second lag is 
positive, which could be due to an overreaction of the GDP to changes in the interest rates or 
the effect of other lagged effects that also influence the GDP. 
Table 4 – Parsimonious models for DLGDP and DLINV 1995 (1) to 2009 (4) 
(probabilities in brackets) 
































































   




   








       




       




       
R
2  0.6747  0.5937  0.7818  0.6928  0.7722  0.6849 












DW  2.31  2.3  2.32  2.32  2.31  2.26 
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For  DLINV,  columns  3  to  6  in  Table  4,  the  models  show  a  strong  positive  relationship 
between changes in investment and changes in GDP, contemporaneous and with one lag. The 
contemporaneous effect is obvious because investment is part of GDP. The lagged effect of 
GDP on investment, on the other hand, means that GDP growth is an important determinant 
of investment. As the Brazilian economy is a relatively closed economy, with exports plus 
imports averaging 21.5% of the GDP from 1995 to 2009, this result indicates how important 
the development of the domestic economy is for investment. Both FC and EC flows have a 
contemporanous positive relation with the changes in investment. In the case of FC there is 
also a negative relation with two lags. This negative relation could be due to the negative 
relation with the first lag of GDP changes. The net effect of the the FC flows on DLINV is 
close to the value of the coefficient for the EC equation, meaning that a 1 billion dollar 
expansion in inflows is associated to an 1.5% expansion in GDP. The explanation for this 
positive effect is possible through various channels: 1) The foreign portfolio investment is the 
funding for the investments that are being made at each period; 2) Foreign investment inflows 
are  related  to  appreciation  in  the  local  currency,  and  this  appreciation  makes  importing 
investment  goods  cheaper,  fostering  investment;  3)  Foreign  portfolio  investments  and 
domestic  changes  in  investment  are  both  driven  by  the  same  expectations  about  future 
economic  performance;  4)  Investment  and  flows  are  both  influenced  by  the  same 
expectations about growth and risk. The positive relationship between flows and investment, 
based on investment funding, exchange rate channel, and expectations seem to be robust in 
this way. 
It is interesting to note that the coefficient for the contemporaneous flow in the FC equation is 
smaller in the estimation containing the sample up to 2008Q3 (column 4), while the second 
lag  is  not  significant.  In  the  case  of  the  EC  equation  (column  6),  the  contemporaneous 
coefficient is not statistically significant. This means that the relation between investment and 
growth became stronger during the crisis period, from the last quarter of 2008 to the fourth 
quarter of 2009. The negative flows at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, when 
investment also had a strong downturn, may explain the stronger relation between the flow 
series and investment when the crisis period is included in the sample. This also gives support 
to the hypothesis that the flows are not directly responsible for investment changes, but that 
the expectations behind FPI flows and domestic investment during the crisis were similar. 
The out of sample forecasts were generated with the observed figures of the explanatory 
variables,  including  the  lagged  values  of  changes  in  GDP  (column  2  in  Table  4)  and 
investment  (columns  4  and  6  in  Table  4),  with  the  equation  estimated  using  data  up  to 
2008Q3.  In  this  way,  forecast  errors  in  one  period  are  not  carried  over  into  subsequent 
periods. The observed and forecasted values with the two standard error interval are plotted 
in Figure 4. 
Results for the out of sample forecasts, Figure 4,  show that for DLGDP the model (column 2 
in Table 4) actually predicted a fall in GDP in the fourth quarter of 2008, but this reduction in 
output was stronger than predicted. The forecast of a fall in output is due to the presence of 
the contemporaneous investment change in the DLGDP change equation. But it is unrealistic 
to think that the fall in investment was predictable. This is corroborated by the bad forecasts   14 
for the last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 in DLINV. Even considering that an 
outflow of fixed income portfolio investment occured in the fourth quarter of 2008 and would 
impact investment, the downturn was much stronger than estimated. 
Both DLGDP and DLINV modeled forecasts improve from the first quarter of 2009. It seems 
that the positive relationship between the flows and investment is strong during the crisis 
period, not only in the downturn. The good fit in the investment equation is also reflected in 
the DLGDP equation through the contemporaneous effect between both real variables. This 
means that expectations, which are not directly observable, must have changed suddenly and 
affected  investment  even  more  than  the  financial  flows.  The  fall  in  investment  was 
transmitted to GDP because it is a component of GDP, but also because other items of GDP 
may have been hit through the same kind of negative expectations or risk aversion. 
The forecast results for both GDP and investment change show that investment was a key 
factor  in  explaining  poor  GDP  performance.  The  assumption  of  a  correct  forecast  for 
investment,  which  would  justify  the  forecast  of  GDP  employing  the  contemporaneous 
observed value of investment change, certainly is difficult to accept for the fourth quarter of 
2008. The  forecasts  for GDP changes would  be even worse  if true expectations and  not 
observed values of the change in investment in the fourth quarter of 2008 were employed. In 
other  words,  the  importance  of  investment  seems  to  be  one  of  the  main  variables  in 
explaining the fall of GDP at the end of 2008. 
Figure 4 - DLGDP and DLINV - Observed (solid line) 
and Forecasted (dotted line, with 2 std error interval) - 
(2008Q4 to 2009Q4) 
GDP Change 
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Results employing FC and EC render similar results in the forecasts because both react to all 
available  information  about  the  Brazilian  economy,  although  FC  is  influenced  by  the 
structurally high Brazilian interest rates, which allow for carry trade operations even when 
interest  rates  in  the  rest  of  the  world  rise,  given  the  high  absolute  difference  between 
domestic and foreign interest rates. 
The  results  for  investment  signify  that  a  change  occurred  in  this  variable’s  behavior  in 
relation to the previous period. Other factors beyond the variables included in the models are 
driving investment, most likely expectations and risk aversion. In-country investment and FPI 
flows can be influenced by the same expectations, but the reaction to investment was even 
stronger than the response in FPI. 
Beyond exchange rates and interest rates, the transmission mechanism behind the relationship 
between flows and real variables includes unobservable variables such as expectations and 
risk aversion. Results of further impulse-response functions (not included, but available on 
request) show that a positive shock in FC is related to domestic currency appreciation and 
lower interest rates. For a shock in EC flows, the interest rate reacts as it would to an FC 
shock, while a clear relation with the exchange rate does not appear. 
The  relationship  between  the  financial  flows  and  real  variables  and  the  importance  of 
expectations  for  both  of  them  ends  in  highlighting  that  economic  fundamentals  and  the 
expectations  about  them  have  strong  roles  in  the  behavior  of  the  economy,  confirming 
previous results in literature like SOARES, PINTO, and  MOREIRA (2010) and TELES and 
LEME (2010). The stronger fundamentals of the Brazilian economy during the crisis of 2008 
in comparison to previous crises allowed for a faster recovery, based on domestic demand. 
5. Conclusion 
The  financial  crisis  of  the  last  quarter  of  2008  triggered  a  generalized  fall  in  output 
throughout the world. Even fast-growing economies slowed their growth rates as a result. The 
recession was triggered in the financial sector and spread to the worldwide economy. In the 
case of emerging economies, there were mixed  feelings. On the one  hand, there was the 
traditional fear that with every crisis these economies would suffer because of their inherent 
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economic  fundamentals  of  the  emerging  economies  were  better  than  in  previous  crisis 
episodes, there could be a ―decoupling‖ of the emerging economies. Soon it was realized that 
the decoupling was not to happen. 
As in other crises, the FPI flows went from countries and markets considered risky to safer 
assets, the flight to quality. The case of developing countries’ flights to quality is not only 
related to flows from more risky stocks to less risky bonds, as in BAUR and LUCEY (2009), 
but also to outflows from a broader set of assets to developed countries. If emerging markets 
were dependent on the inflow of resources to finance their economic growth, the reversal of 
the flows would hamper the growth capabilities of these economies. In this case, there would 
be a link between the financial flows and growth. In fact, the FPI flows were negative in 
Brazil in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. 
The  results  of  the  impulse-response  functions  in  this  paper  show that there  is  a  positive 
relationship in the short run between fixed income flows and GDP changes and investment in 
Brazil. For equity flows this relationship is positive in the short run, turns negative, and then 
disappears  after  10  quarters.  This  means  that  flows  anticipate  the  behavior  of  the  real 
variables. When allowing for contemporaneous relations between the flows and investment, 
the positive relationship is stronger when the crisis period is included in estimations instead 
of in the period preceding the crisis. This means that investment and flows are reacting to the 
same kind of expectations. 
With more solid fundamentals concerning Brazilian fiscal and external accounts when the 
2008 crisis erupted, FPI outflows were less intense in comparison to previous crises. It also 
allowed that broader economic policy measures could be adopted, due to greater degrees of 
freedom in government actions. The fundamentals and perspectives of the economy resulted 
in positive FPI flows by the second quarter of 2009. Beyond the theoretical explanations of 
the influences of FPI on the financial system, sound macroeconomic policies also affect the 
flows  and  the  real  economy  through  their  effect  on  expectations.  GDP  growth  was 
concentrated in domestic demand factors, namely consumption, and investment and flows 
followed this positive trend. 
Further research will be necessary to explain the operation of the relations between FPI flows 
and growth. But it is clear from the results in this paper that the financial link is significant in 
explaining the behavior of growth and investment in the Brazilian economy, as are internal 
and external expectations, as well as the transmission mechanism behind it. Interest rates and 
exchange rates seem to have a role in this sense, meaning the effects of the flows have to be 
considered when economic policy decisions are made concerning interest rates or factors that 
may limit capital flows. 
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